European Super League

The European Super League crashed into the headlines this week almost as suddenly and dramatically as it collapsed.

On Monday 19th April, 12 of Europe’s leading clubs announced their membership of the league, which involved a $100bn broadcasting deal and a €200 – €300m signing bonus per club. After uproar from fans and politicians globally, 6 UK clubs pulled out of the deal just two days later, at which the deal fell through. First off, the response to the league was highly emotional, arguably at the expense of the facts. Take a look at the rather ironic comparison between the European Super League and the formation of the Premier League. In 1992, England’s First Division broke from the historic Football League, which had been founded in 1888. The radical new Premier League was the product of financial struggles for UK football in the 1980s combined with the appeal of a lucrative TV broadcasting deal. Sound familiar?

People are failing to appreciate that there are consequences to the fact that the institution of football has been commercialised.

The core criticism of the flopped European Super League is that it’s an unashamed capitalist business venture that has abandoned the historic roots football, with Alexander Čeferin, president of the UEFA, describing the league as “fuelled purely by greed”. Whether or not the league was right or wrong is a matter of opinion, but it seems to me that people are failing to appreciate that there are consequences to the fact that the institution of football has been commercialised. In many ways it’s almost shocking that fans were so surprised by the league’s formation.

European football is a €29bn industry, and UK football is overwhelmingly backed by foreign investors: the American company Fenway Sports Group owns Liverpool FC, Roman Abramovich owns Chelsea FC, and American Stan Kroenke owns Arsenal. We’re emerging from the pandemic, a period through which football, like other industries, has financially suffered. Clubs are looking to boost revenue and profit through strategic partnerships, making the league in many ways a savvy business decision. An apt comparison may be to the USA’s privatised healthcare system; it may be unfair that healthcare is so costly, but it’s an industry partaking in a market, meaning it must answer both customers and shareholders and will inevitably be oriented toward profit. Placards in protest of the league read ‘fans not customers’, but the business model built around football would beg to differ.

Placards in protest of the league read ‘fans not customers’, but the business model built around football would beg to differ.

Second, given that these European clubs are businesses, why did they not anticipate their fans’ backlash – which is the true PR disaster? This scenario could have been avoided or handled better had clubs strategised, listened to their consumers, and undertaken user testing or opinion surveys. A key lesson for businesses from this debacle could be how fundamental it is to pursue a structure and strategy that is accurately aligned with your customer needs – or at least their emotional desires. German football serves as a good example here. German clubs are 51% owned by their fans, explaining their absence from the league and why they would never have been a candidate for membership.

Whilst the backlash to the league has been enormous, there’s no denying that European football is a business before it is a sport. Perhaps this episode is the catalyst we needed for a conversation about the future of football, because you certainly can’t create an industry and then not allow it to evolve. One thing’s for sure, this isn’t the last we’ve heard (or seen) of a breakaway league.